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
ORDER

LARRY BOWOTO VS. CHEVRONTEXACO CORPORATION

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

Larry Bowoto, et. al.,) Case No.: CGC-03-417580
Plaintiff,) ORDER RE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE) AND CHOICE OF LAW
VS.	
ChevronTexaco Corporation, et. al.,	
Defendant.	

THE PRECLUSIVE AFFECT OF FEDERAL COURT'S DECISION

The principles of collateral estoppel prevent this court from relitigating the issues already ruled upon by the Honorable Judge Illston in the recently decided <u>Bowoto v. Chevron Corp.</u>, No. C 99002506 (N.D. Cal.) available at WL 2349336. This court is bound by Judge Illston's findings in regards to choice-of-law and the act of state doctrine.

a.) Collateral Estoppel

Collateral estoppel applies "[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim." <u>Lumpkin</u>, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1229-30 (quoting Restatement (Second) Judgments § 27).

Collateral estoppel is a fundamental principle of our judicial system. The principle promotes a number of policy objectives. It "prevents a litigant from being 'subjected to consecutive proceedings raising the same factual allegations.'" <u>Lumpkin v.</u> Jordan (1996) 49 Cal. App. 4th 1223, 1229-30. By doing so, collateral estoppel helps to ensure judicial efficiency and consistency.

The federal court's decision in <u>Bowoto</u>, at WL 2349336 involves the same general set of facts at issue in the state case. In addition, the parties have briefed and the federal court has decided the act of state and choice of law questions presented here. The question presented is whether a party who has fully litigated an issue in Federal court, and has received a final judgment on the merits is allowed to relitigate the same issue in State court against the same adversary. The answer is no.

b.) Full Faith and Credit

Because the original litigation occurred in Federal court and the request for preclusion is being made in State Court, a brief discussion of the interrelationship between the two jurisdictions is an appropriate starting point for the discussion.

Article IV, section 1 of the Constitution of the United States requires that state courts afford full faith and credit to the judgments of the courts of sister states. The implementing statute, 28 USC Section 1738 requires that state courts likewise accord full faith and credit to federal court judgments. This includes federal preclusion rules. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 87; Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 Mich.L.Rev. 946 (1998).

Consequently, a federal court "order or judgment has the same effect in the courts of this state as it would have in a federal court." Estate of Hilton (1988) 199 Cal. App.3d 1145, 1168; Levy v. Cohen, (1997) 19 Cal. 3d 165, 172-173 ("Full faith and credit must be given to a final order or judgment of a federal court.").

c.) Do Judge Illston's orders in the federal case have a preclusive effect on this court?

The first question is whether Judge Illston's orders, which are subject to appeal, are final judgments on the merits. They are

California courts look to federal law to determine whether a federal court judgment is final for collateral estoppel purposes. <u>Levy v. Cohen</u>, (1977) 19 Cal. 3d 165, 172; <u>Lumpkin v. Jordan (1996)</u> 49 Cal. App. 4th 1223, 1230; <u>Martin v. Martin (1970)</u> 2 Cal.3d 752761, fn.13.

"The federal rule is that a judgment or order, once rendered, is final for purposes of res judicata, until reversed on appeal or modified or set aside in the court of rendition." Levy, 19 Cal. 3d at 172. "A federal court judgment is final even if an appeal for that judgment is currently pending." (Calhoun v. Franchise Tax Board (1978) 20 Cal.3d 881, 887. "Furthermore, for

collateral estoppel purposes, the federal court's ruling on the summary judgment, even though appealed, must be considered final." <u>Lumpkin</u>, 1230.

Accordingly, Judge Illston's orders are final judgments on the merits for the purposes of precluding relitigation of the issues.

When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim." <u>Lumpkin</u>. 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1229-30 (quoting Restatement (Second) Judgments § 27).

Collateral estoppel "prevents a litigant from being 'subjected to consecutive proceedings raising the same factual allegations." <u>Id.</u> at 1230. Unlike res judicata, it does not matter for collateral estoppel whether the same cause of action was involved in the two actions or whether the cause of action in the second case could have been litigated in the previous suit. Collateral estoppel "preclude[s] a party to prior litigation from redisputing issues therein decided against him, even when those issues bear on different claims raided in a later case." <u>Roos v. Red</u> (2005) 130 Cal. App. 4th 870, 879.

For the following issues: choice-of-law and act of state doctrine, it is this court's determination that an identical issue was presented to Judge Illston, sufficiently argued by the litigants, and ruled on. Therefore, her decision collaterally estops this court from reconsidering the issues.

Judge Illston's Orders Which are Binging on This Case

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Judge Illston ruled on two issues which bind this court through collateral estoppel. The issues are: choice-of-law and the act of state doctrine.

a.) Choice-of-Law

Judge Illston determined that Nigerian law governs the events that occurred on the barge, and that California law should govern the remainder of plaintiff's claims.

b.) The Act of State Doctrine

Judge Illston determined that the act of state doctrine does not prevent plaintiffs from litigating their claims.

Defendant's urge the court to reconsider the applicability of the act of state doctrine due to the fact that the plaintiffs in this case are seeking injunctive relief instead of the monetary relief that they sought in the federal court case. Judge Illston's ruling, however, was that there was no act of state. Any consideration of the type of relief sought, in the act of state doctrine analysis, would necessarily come after finding that there was an act of state.

Judge Illston's ruling is that the defendants failed to make even the threshold showing that an act of state was being considered. As Judge Illston writes, "Defendants urge that the acts were "not ad hoc decision of local officers, but authorized operation conducted within the chain of command of the Nigerian military," yet they fail to present evidence of the "chain of command" at work." (See Order Re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment on the Act of State

Defense). Without this evidence, Judge Illston correctly finds that the act of state doctrine can not apply. This issue is not changed even in the slightest because the plaintiff's in the state court case are seeking injunctive relief. Therefore, Judge Illston's decision does collaterally estop this court from reanalyzing whether the act of state doctrine is a viable defense in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: (1/13/07

Kevin M. McCarthy Judge of the Superior Court

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

County of San Francisco Department 604

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Plaintiffs

Case Number: 417580

VS.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

ChevronTexaco Corporation, et. al

Defendants

(CCP 1013a (4))

I, Marilyn L. Flores, a Deputy Clerk of the Superior Court of the County of San Francisco, certify that I am not a party to the within action.

On November 13, 2007 I served the attached ORDER RE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE AND CHOICE OF LAW by placing a copy thereof in a sealed envelope, addressed as follows:

Theresa M. Traber, Esq. TRABER & VOORHEES 128 N. Fair Oaks Avenue, Suite 204 Pasadena, CA 91103 Robert Mittelstaedt, Esq. Caroline Mitchell, Esq. Lara Kolios, Esq. JONES DAY 555 California St., 25th Floor San Francisco, CA 94104

Cindy Cohn, Esq.
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
454 Shotwell Street
San Francisco, CA 94110

and, I then placed the sealed envelopes in the outgoing mail at 400 McAllister Street, San Francisco, CA. 94102 on the date indicated above for collection, attachment of required prepaid postage, and mailing on that date following standard court practices.

Dated: November 13, 2007

GORDON PARK-LI, Clerk

Marilyn L. Flores, Deputy Clerk